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Abstract 
This paper uses nationally representative linked workplace-employee data from the British 
2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey to examine the operation of shared capitalist 
forms of pay – profit-sharing and group pay for performance, employee share ownership, and 
stock options—and their link to productivity.  It shows that shared capitalism has grown in 
the UK, as it has in the US; that different forms of shared capitalist pay complement each 
other and other labour practices in the sense that firms use them together more than they 
would if they chose modes of pay and work practices independently; and that workplaces 
switch among schemes frequently, which suggests that they have trouble optimizing and the 
transactions cost of switching are relatively low.  Among the single schemes, share 
ownership has the clearest positive association with productivity, but its impact is largest 
when firms combine it with other forms of shared capitalist pay and modes of organization. 
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Introduction 
There are three reasons for exploring the impact of shared capitalism – employee shared 
ownership, payment via stock options, profit sharing and related group incentive pay -- on 
economic outcomes in the UK.  
 The first is that shared capitalism is widespread.  Table 1 shows the incidence and 
coverage of the major shared capitalist modes of pay in Britain for private sector workplaces 
with 5 or more employees in the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey.  Around 
one-fifth of workplaces had some form of employee share ownership scheme, which includes 
the Save as You Earn (SAYE) – an all-employee plan that gives workers tax breaks when 
they save to purchase their employer’s shares but that does not require that they purchase the 
shares; the share incentive plan (SIP) - an all-employee scheme that offers tax breaks for 
employees holding shares in the company for which they work; and the Company Share 
Option Plan (CSOP) – where companies can grant chosen employees or directors up to 
£30,000 of tax and national insurance advantaged share options.   The majority of the stock 
ownership plans are open to all non-managerial employees in part because the tax code 
usually requires such coverage to obtain tax breaks. 
 Turning to profit sharing and related group incentive pay, one-quarter of workplaces 
had some form of profit-related pay for non-managerial employees, and one-quarter had 
some form of group-based payment by results, which is akin to gain-sharing in the US.  The 
vast majority of share ownership schemes and over two-thirds of profit-related pay schemes 
cover all non-managerial employees.  The percentage of employees with these schemes 
exceeds the percentage of workplaces with the schemes because larger workplaces are more 
likely to choose to pay workers in these ways. 
 The fourth row in the table combines the three group-level performance pay methods 
into an additive scale that takes the value 0 if the firm has none of these methods, 1 if it has 
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one, 2 if it has two, and 3 if it has all three methods.  It shows that half the firms have at least 
one scheme and that 62% of workers are covered by at least one scheme.  Shared capitalism 
is, from this metric, as much part and parcel of the British capitalist economy as it is of the 
American economy. 
 The last row of the table gives the proportion of workplaces and employees who 
receive variable pay as individuals either through pay for performance or through merit pay.  
We treat these modes of payment separately because the “sharing” is related to individual 
performance as opposed to group performance and is thus more akin to piece rate pay than 
profit-sharing.1 
 The second reason for examining shared capitalism in the UK is that the amount and 
nature of shared capitalist arrangements have changed over time.  Profit-related pay and 
share-ownership schemes grew in the 1980s, spurred by government tax incentives.  Data 
from Bryson, Pendleton, and Whitfield (2008, tables 5 and 6) on workplaces with 25 
employees or more show that the proportion of private sector workplaces with some shared 
capitalist scheme increased from 40% in 1984 to 63% in 2004.  The proportion of firms 
having profit-related pay increased from 19% to 44%, the proportion having group pay for 
performance increased from 15% to 25%, and the proportion having employee ownership 
increased from 22% to 28%. 
 The third reason is that the UK government has encouraged shared capitalist modes of 
pay with favorable tax treatment over time.  In the 1980s the Conservative government gave 
tax advantages to profit-related pay.  Since 1997 the Labour government has given tax 
advantages to share ownership schemes at the expense of profit-related pay schemes, which 
                                                 
1 Factor analyses of the five types of performance pay – individual payments-by-results, merit 
pay, group payments-by-results, share ownership and profit-related pay – identified two 
factors with eigen values above 1.  Share ownership and profit-related pay load together, as 
do individual payments-by-results and merit pay. Group-level payments-by-results had a 
lower loading which was pretty similar across the two factors.   
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became fully taxable.2 Unlike the US, which gives tax breaks for collective ownership of 
shares through ESOPs, the UK gives breaks for individual share ownership.  HM Revenue & 
Customs estimates that for 2002-2003 the Treasury spent about £800 million in tax relief per 
annum on these schemes (Oxera, 2007a, p. 3).  To see whether this is justifiable the Treasury 
commissioned an extensive econometric study of the impacts of shared capitalism on 
productivity (Oxera, 2007a, 2007b), whose findings we compare with ours shortly. 
 Our analyses uses linked employer-employee data from the British 2004 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 3 to estimate the impact of shared capitalism on 
productivity and to assess some of the mechanisms by which it produces different outcomes 
at different workplaces.  The 2004 WERS provides cross-sectional information on some 1500 
private sector workplaces obtained from HR managers and from employees working in those 
workplaces.  With the survey weights used throughout results are nationally representative of 
workplaces with 5 or more employees in Britain.   
We find that:  
 1) Different forms of shared capitalist pay complement each other in the sense that 
firms are more likely to have them in combinations than if they chose forms of pay 
independently.   
 2) Firms change modes of compensation frequently, with some adopting schemes and 
others eliminating them so that the gross changes in schemes are far more numerous than the 
net changes. 
 3) Shared capitalist pay is positively associated with other forms of pay and 
workplace arrangements: individual payment by results, employer reports of devolving 
                                                 
2 For details: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/emp_share_schemes/menu.htm. 
3 For full details of the survey see Kersley et al. (2006) and Chaplin et al. (2005). 
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decision-making to employees, using subjective appraisals of worker performance, 
monitoring of outputs, and reduced monitoring of workers. 
 4) Firms with shared capitalist pay, particularly with share ownership schemes, have 
higher labor productivity than firms without such forms of pay.  The impacts of shared 
capitalism on productivity are larger when the firm combines several schemes.  
 
Conceptual Issues  
The traditional rationale for shared capitalist pay is that it aligns worker and employer 
objectives in maximizing output.  To do this, shared capitalism must overcome free-rider 
problems associated with any group incentive system and deal with the fact that virtually any 
contingent pay, including piece rates for individuals, gives incentives for some forms of 
desirable behavior but not for other forms.4 Principal/agent problems are ubiquitous in a 
world where contracts are necessarily incomplete. 
 Shared capitalism is normally associated with certain modes of work organization.  
Since firms that pay workers on the basis of firm or group performance do so in the hope of 
inducing them to take actions that improve firm performance, they are also likely to empower 
workers to make decisions that affect performance, particularly where the employee has 
private information about the production process.  Group incentive pay may also be used as 
an incentive for workers to share their knowledge about the production process with other 
workers and the employer (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Jones, 1987).   
 By contrast, giving workers greater decision-making power absent financial 
incentives might adversely affect motivation (Ben-Avner and Jones, 1995): “they want me to 
                                                 
4 Annual profit-sharing bonuses may, for example, induce workers to try hard in the short run 
but to neglect activities that benefit the firm over a longer horizon.  Worker ownership whose 
benefits do not reach workers until they retire may fail to induce workers to try hard in the 
present.  Piece rates or tournaments can reduce cooperation and the sharing of knowledge at 
workplaces and even induce one worker to sabotage a rival. 
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do more without paying me more”.  And giving shared capitalist pay without greater 
decision-making power may also fail to affect productivity: “they are making my income 
risky by varying my pay with performance without giving me autonomy to raise 
performance”.   
Shared capitalist modes of pay should also be associated with a shift in management 
monitoring from watching what workers do to monitoring their final products.  When the 
firm cannot readily observe effort but can monitor outputs, incentive pay related to outputs 
will motivate effort, substituting for monitoring effort.  By contrast, when the firm finds it 
easier to monitor workers than to monitor output, we would expect the firm to use straight-
time pay.5 Indeed, Frederick Taylor viewed output-based pay as a mechanism for the 
avoidance of shirking.6 The advent of ICT-based monitoring, including on-line monitoring, 
electronic point-of-sale equipment and electronic time recording gave management new tools 
to monitor previously difficult-to-monitor jobs and output, potentially making this interaction 
more important than in the past.7   
 Some analysts view individual pay for performance as the polar opposite of group 
incentive pay.  Individual pay for performance is a form of piece rate that induces employees 
to improve their personal output (and maybe to sabotage the output of others if that might 
improve their chances for a promotion) whereas group pay induces them to work 
cooperatively with others.  Either you work for yourself or you work for the group.  Under 
                                                 
5 Daniel and Millward argue (1983: 205): “Traditionally the purpose of PBR systems of pay 
has been to encourage workers to increase effort and output….In practice….there has been a 
tendency for PBR to become more an instrument of management control designed to ensure 
consistency of output.”  
6 Gallie et al. (1998) show that control of workers through close supervision, pay incentives 
and appraisal systems all grew in Britain in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
7 White et al. (2004: 100) estimated that in 2002 ICT-based monitoring systems were ‘already 
covering around half the workforce and appear to be spreading rapidly’.  Half of the 
workplaces with ICT monitoring were using it to evaluate individuals (op. cit., 96). 
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some conditions, the two forms of pay may indeed be antithetical but under others individual 
pay for performance can complement group incentive pay.  Consider a situation in which 
maximizing output and profits requires that workers do their own work and also help others.  
In this case management will need two instruments to induce workers to spend some time 
working on their own and some time working cooperatively.  Just as profit-seeking 
managements mix imperfect objective measures of performance with subjective evaluation 
(Baker, Gibbons, Murphy, 1994), management could mix pay for individual performance and 
pay for group performance to induce workers to undertake both activities.  Management 
could even use individual pay for performance as a tool against the temptation to free-ride on 
the group.  
 The most far-reaching hypothesis in recent analyses of the effect of human resource 
management on productivity and labor practices is the ‘complementarities thesis’ that 
advanced labor practices work most effectively when bundled together into a consistent high-
performance workplace (Ichniowski et al, 1996; Pil and MacDuffie, 1996).  This hypothesis 
implies that firms should adopt shared capitalist modes of pay and complementary forms of 
work organization as a package rather than introducing them individually.  Some analysts go 
further and link shared capitalism with the firm’s competitive strategy (Huselid, 1995; 
Schuler and Jackson, 1987).  They argue that firms that compete on the basis of the quality of 
output should be more attuned to group incentives than firms that compete on the basis of low 
cost of generic output, where piece rates might be more effective.   
 We examine the notion that shared capitalist modes of pay and work organization has 
important complementarities in two ways.   
 First, we test whether firms choose combinations of pay schemes in proportions that 
diverge from what we would expect had they chosen them as independent draws from 
separate urns.  Under the null hypothesis, if 50% of firms have profit sharing and 50% have 
 6
employee share ownership, the proportion of firms with both profit-sharing and employee 
ownership would be 25%.  If the complementary hypothesis is correct, the proportion of 
firms with both practices would exceed 25%, whereas if the forms are substitutes, the 
proportion with both practices would fall short of 25%.  Using a regression design, we also 
examine whether individual pay for results, managerial monitoring, and worker decision-
making are related to shared capitalist modes of pay, other factors held fixed.  If the 
complementary hypothesis is correct, the shared capitalist practices should have positive 
effects on worker-friendly practices and negative effects on hierarchical control practices    
 Second, we follow the bulk of the complementary literature by estimating production 
functions that relate output to inputs, including modes of compensation, and test for 
complementary relations among modes of compensation.  If the complementary hypothesis is 
correct, shared capitalist practices X and Z will have greater effects on output when they 
operate together than when they operate separately.  This implies that the regression 
coefficient on interaction terms such as their product XZ should be positive. 
 As with other production function models, without identifiably exogenous variation in 
input variables – in this case shared capitalist pay as well as capital and labor inputs - the 
regression results are best interpreted as reflecting associations among endogenous variables.  
Depending on the heterogeneity among firms, moreover, the associations could be affected 
by selectivity and thus differ from the associations we would get from randomly assigning 
compensation and practices among firms.  Still, our two-part analysis -- looking for 
complementary links in the combinations of shared capitalist modes of pay and looking for 
such links in production functions -- provides a stronger test of the hypothesized positive 
effect of shared capitalism on outputs than would analysis of either combinations or 
production functions separately.  
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Combinations of Practices 
Figure 1 uses a Venn diagram to display the incidence of combinations of profit-related pay, 
share ownership, and group-based incentives in private sector workplaces with 5 or more 
employees in the WERS 2004 data.  Our test of complementarity in these data compares 
those proportions with the proportions that would result if the firm selected practices 
independently on the basis of the proportion in the entire sample.  The bottom part of the 
figure gives the actual incidence of each element in the diagram and the incidence we would 
expect from the binomial distribution of independent draws based on the proportion of each 
mode in the population.  Half of the workplaces have no group-based incentive payments, 
which is statistically significantly different from the 39% predicted from the independent 
hypothesis.  Twenty-seven percent had one scheme compared to 43.5% predicted to have a 
single scheme; 17% of workplaces had two schemes, which is close to the 15.5% predicted to 
have two schemes, but 6.2% had all three schemes, which is over three times the 1.7% 
predicted to have three schemes.  Thus, there were more workplaces at the extremes of the 
distribution than predicted – the sign of complementarity.  
 Using the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, which surveyed workplaces 
with 25 or more employees, we made similar computations for that year.  These data show a 
pattern that is similar to that in 2004, albeit with much lower levels of the use of the various 
schemes.  In 1984 59.5% of workplaces had no form of shared capitalist pay compared to a 
predicted level of 52.9%; 25.3% had one form of the pay compared to a predicted 36.6% 
whereas 13.7% had two such forms compared to a predicted 9.2% while 1.4% had three such 
forms compared to a predicted 0.7%.  More workplaces had 2 or 3 forms of shared capitalist 
pay and more had 0 forms of shared capitalist pay than predicted.  In sum, the calculations for 
1984 as well as for 2004 reject the null hypothesis that workplaces select shared capitalist 
modes of compensation independently in favor of the complementary hypothesis.  
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Changes in Modes of Pay  
The 2004 WERS Panel provides panel data on a random sub-set of a nationally representative 
sample of workplaces with 10 or more employees that the survey interviewed in 1998.  The 
longitudinal file allows us to examine changes in shared capitalist modes of compensation 
over time.  Rows 1 and 2 of Table 2 record the incidence of different schemes in the panel 
data in 1998 and 2004.  We differentiate the deferred profit-related pay systems from the 
others to highlight the fact that the incidence of profit-related pay declined due to the 
cessation of the tax advantage given to deferred profit-related pay schemes.  The percentage 
with other profit-related schemes remained constant at 42 per cent; the percentage of 
workplaces with employee share ownership schemes also remained stable, so that the primary 
increase in shared capitalist modes of compensation occurred through a 10 percentage point 
increase in group payments by results.  The net change figures in row 3 show rather modest 
changes in the overall distribution. 
 But the part of the table labeled changes in distribution shows that beneath the 
stability in the non-deferred PRP schemes and in the employee share ownership schemes 
there is considerable switching among schemes by workplaces.  Underlying the 42% constant 
proportion of workplaces with profit-related pay exclusive of the deferred schemes are shifts 
in nearly one-third of the workplaces: 15 per cent of workplaces adopted profit-related pay 
while 15 percent ended schemes other than the deferred ones that lost tax privileges.  
Similarly, underlying the 20% constant percentage of workplaces with Employee Share 
Ownership Schemes is a change in 19 per cent of workplaces.  Even the group payments-by-
results, which increased by 10 percentage points from 1998 to 2004, show a gross change of 
27 percentage points. 
 How should we interpret this huge difference between net and gross changes?  One 
interpretation of the high amount of switching is that it reflects experimentation on the part of 
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employers in search of the best arrangements.  Another interpretation is that firms change 
practices because the optimal compensation system changes, perhaps because what matters to 
employers is the ‘newness’ of a scheme rather than the attributes of a particular payment 
method.  Whichever interpretation is right, it would seem that these changes are not major 
overhauls in employer practices, implying that the treatments and the inputs required to 
maintain them are unlikely to be large – that is, switching costs are low.  
 To see how the shifts in programs among workplaces might work themselves out in 
the long run, we have applied Markov chain analysis to the 1998-2004 panel data.  
Specifically we organized the data into transition matrices whose elements are the 
probabilities of moving from a given combination of practices to other combinations and, on 
the assumption that the transition probabilities are constant, estimated the equilibrium or 
steady state distribution of practices.   
 Table 3 records our results.  Panel A defines the state variables simply as the number 
of shared capitalist pay programs at a workplace.  Since there are four possible states, from 0 
to 3 programs, the transition matrix is 4 by 4.  We raised the matrix to the power 2000 to 
obtain the steady state distribution.  The columns labeled 1998 and 2004 give the proportion 
of workplaces with the specified numbers of programs in each year, while the column labeled 
equilibrium is our estimated steady state distribution.  It “predicts” that the number of 
workplaces with 2-3 programs will rise while the numbers with 1 program will remain nearly 
constant, so that shared capitalism will increase gradually over time.  Panel B defines the 
state variables as each of the combinations in our Venn diagram.  Since in this case there are 
eight possible states, the transition matrix is 8 by 8.  The calculations here tell a similar but 
more detailed story about change.  The Markov analysis predicts a drop in the proportion of 
workplaces with only ESOS in contrast to the increase in that proportion from 1998 to 2004 
 10
and an increase in the proportion with ESOS and profit-related pay in contrast to the decrease 
in that proportion form 1998 to 2004.   
 Consistent with the analysis of the 2004 patterns in Figure 1, the analysis of the panel 
data supports the complementarity hypothesis, with the number of workplaces having all 
three programs and the number expected to have more in the future exceeding the number 
that would be found if firms selected the modes of compensation independently. 
 
Relation to Other Workplace Practices 
To examine the relation between shared capitalism and other workplace policies and practices 
– individual payment by result, worker autonomy, and managerial monitoring of work 
activity, outputs, and appraisals -- we use a linear regression model.  The dependent variables 
in the regression are the measures of workplace policies and practices.  The key independent 
variables are the forms of shared capitalist compensation.8  The regressions hold fixed factors 
such as industry, size of the workplace, size of firm and the like.    
 Table 4 presents the regression coefficients on dummy variables for employee stock 
ownership, group payment by results, and profit-related pay; and on dummy variables for the 
seven independent categories in the Venn diagram.  
 The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is a dichotomous measure of whether 
workers receive individual payment by results (see Appendix).  The estimated coefficients 
show that individual pay by results is more likely in the presence of shared capitalist pay than 
otherwise.  In column 1 the biggest effects occur for group payment by results, indicating that 
these two forms of compensation are very closely linked.  In column 2 the largest coefficient 
occurs when workplaces have all three forms of shared capitalist pay.  These results suggest 
that, as argued, individual and group payment for results are complements, though we have 
                                                 
8 Results were not sensitive to the use of probit or ordered probit estimation. 
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no reliable way with the WERS data to determine whether firms with the two modes of pay 
are in fact choosing the optimal levels.  
 The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is merit pay, which is based on a 
subjective assessment of individual performance by a supervisor or manager.  Again, there 
are indications of a positive association with share capitalism, but in this case it is confined to 
an association with profit-related pay. 
Columns 5 and 6 measure employee autonomy in decision-making as reported by 
human resource managers in response to a question regarding “the extent to which you would 
say that individuals in the largest occupational group: have variety in their work, discretion 
over how they do their work, control over the pace at which they work, involvement in 
decisions over how their work is organized?”  The responses have a four point scale (“a lot, 
some, a little, none”), from which we formed a summated rating that went from 0 (‘none’ on 
all four items) to 12 (‘a lot’ on all four items).9  Ten per cent of workplaces scored less than 5 
on this scale, 47 per cent scored 5-8 and 44 per cent scored 9 or more.   
The regression coefficients show modestly greater autonomy for worker decision-
making in the presence of shared capitalist pay than otherwise, with the primary impact 
coming through profit-related pay in column 5 and the combination of profit-related-pay and 
group payment for results in column 6.  While it is dangerous to compare results from 
different surveys across countries, the link between shared capitalist pay and employee 
decision-making seems weaker in the UK than in the US.10   
                                                 
9 Factor analysis of these items produces a single factor with an eigenvalue of 2.21 and a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.73, suggesting that the items are aspects of a single construct. 
10  As an alternative measure, we also examined employee responses to an analogous 
question: “In general, how much influence do you have over the following….What tasks you 
do in your job, the pace at which you work, how you do your work, the order in which you 
carry out tasks, the time you start or finish your working day?” with responses coded using an 
additive scale comparable to that used for employers.  Because there were five questions the 
scale ran from (0, 15). This variable was unrelated to shared capitalist modes of pay.    
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  The dependent variable in columns 7 and 8 measures the extent of managerial 
monitoring of worker inputs.  It is based on responses to questions about whether workplaces 
used managers or supervisors to monitor the quality of work, whether supervisors have the 
power to dismiss workers, and whether workplaces have a high percentage (20%+) of 
supervisors among their employees, and on whether the firm reports that employees monitor 
the quality of their own output (in which case a point is deducted from this scale).  This 
variable is scaled from 0 to 4 (see footnote to the table for details).  The regression 
coefficients show that share capitalism is not significantly associated with managerial 
monitoring of worker inputs.   
 The dependent variable in columns 9 and 10 is a measure of employer monitoring of 
outputs.  It is based on questions regarding the use of inspectors in separate departments, 
customer surveys, keeping records of faults and complaints, and the use of records to monitor 
labor productivity targets.  This variable is scaled from 0 to 4.  The regression coefficients 
show that shared capitalist pay is strongly associated with more managerial monitoring of 
outputs, with employee share schemes having the largest impact in column 9 and the 
presence of all three schemes or the combination of share schemes and group payments-by-
results having the largest impact in column 10. 
 Finally, columns 11 and 12 examine the relation between employer use of appraisal 
systems of how workers are doing and shared capitalist pay.  The measure of appraisal is an 
additive scale based on whether the firm appraises all non-managerial staff, if appraisals 
occur half-yearly or quarterly, and if non-managerial pay is linked to performance appraisal. 
This variable is scaled from 0 to 3.  The positive regression coefficient on the share 
ownership dummy variable in column 11 shows that workplaces with shared ownership 
modes of pay do more appraisal of employees than other workplaces.  In column 12 the 
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message is similar with large coefficients on the interaction relating to workplaces that have 
stock ownership and on the coefficient on the ‘only share ownership’ dummy variable. 
 The associations between shared capitalist compensation and the other policies and 
practices shown in these regressions do not tell us how management coordinates the various 
pay schemes to form a coherent working environment but they do support the notion that 
shared capitalist arrangements work best in conjunction with other innovations in the 
employment relationship consistent with the model we sketched out earlier.    
 
Basic Productivity Relations 
‘Share ownership offers employees a real stake in their company…encourage(s) the new 
enterprise culture of team work in which everyone contributes and everyone benefits from 
success… Employee share ownership has a contribution to make towards increasing 
Britain’s productivity.”  (HM Treasury, 1998: 1-2) 
 To see how shared capitalist modes of pay affect productivity we estimate production 
functions.  We have three measures of productivity.  The first measure is an index based on 
the responses of human resource managers to the question: ‘Compared with other 
establishments in the same industry how would you assess your workplace’s labor 
productivity?’ Responses are ordered in a five-point scale from ‘a lot better than average’ to 
‘a lot below average’.  Of the 1,512 human resource managers who answered this question in 
the 2004 WERS, 6% thought their workplace’s productivity was either ‘below’ or ‘a lot 
below average’11, 42% thought it was ‘average’, 42% thought it was ‘better than average’ and 
                                                 
11 We collapsed the responses ‘a lot below’ and ‘below average’ into a single category due to 
the small number of responses in that part of the distribution. 
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10% described it as ‘a lot above average’. Most British studies of the effect of modes of 
compensation on productivity have used questions of this form in their analyses.12   
 We supplement this measure with two accounting measures collected in the 2004 
WERS by a Financial Performance Questionnaire:  gross output per worker (the ratio of total 
value of sales of goods and services over the past year to total employment); and gross value-
added per worker (the ratio of total sales minus the total value of purchases of goods, 
materials and services divided by total employment). 13  These measures are correlated with 
one another at 0.39.  But they are not correlated with manager reports of productivity relative 
to the industry average, suggesting that the financial performance questionnaire and human 
resource manager reports on productivity contain different information about the workplace. 
 Given these three measures, our first inclination was to give more weight to the 
accounting measures in our productivity analysis.  The accounting measures underlie 
standard production function regressions and are more objective than the management 
reports.  But we quickly learned that the accounting measures have problems.  Only 47 
percent of workplaces participating in WERS responded to the financial performance 
questions, and some responses were such large outliers that we dropped them from the 
analysis.14 After trimming the top and bottom 2.5 percent of values, we had valid data for 586 
workplaces for productivity measured as sales per employee and for 524 workplaces for 
productivity measured as value-added per employee.15 This reduced our sample by about 
                                                 
12 Kersley et al. (2006: 287-289) compare alternative productivity measures. 
13 The FPQ questionnaire is: www.wers2004.info/wers2004/crosssection.php#fpq.  Chaplin et al. 
(2005) describe the data and administration of the questionnaire. 
14 Most of the data relate to an accounting period ending in 2004, with some data relating to a 
period ending in 2003.  Where data did not relate to a full calendar year we adjusted 
accordingly.    
15 The estimation samples are a little lower because we dropped a few observations with 
missing dependent variables.    
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60%.  We will give roughly equal weight to the three estimates in our assessment of the 
effects of shared capitalism on productivity. 
 Table 5 gives the coefficients for the association between the three measures of 
productivity and the incidence and intensity of shared capitalist pay in terms of the proportion 
of workers covered.  All models are run with sampling weights that are the inverse of the 
probability of sample selection.  The weights for the models that use the financial 
performance questionnaire data also adjust for non-response, as described in Chaplin et al. 
(2005).  We use a robust estimator to account for heteroskedasticity.  The coefficients in 
models (1) and (2) are from ordered probits for the subjective measure of labor productivity 
relative to the industry average.  The coefficients in models (3) and (4) and in models (5) and 
(6) are from linear regression models for log sales per employee and log value added per 
employee, respectively.   
 The odd-numbered columns give the results for the incidence of shared capitalist 
forms of pay.  They show share ownership schemes are positively associated with labor 
productivity on all three productivity measures while neither profit-related pay nor group pay 
for performance have any noticeable relation to productivity.  The even-numbered columns 
give the results when the measure of shared capitalist pay considers the coverage of the pay 
system – whether it includes all workers or just management and perhaps a select few others.  
They show that the stock ownership schemes that enlist all employees raise productivity by 
all three of our measures, while schemes targeted at managers only are positively associated 
with sales per employee.  Again, the other forms of shared capitalism have little relation to 
the measures of productivity.  
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Complementarity in Production 
For our production function test of the complementarity of shared capitalist forms of pay, we 
regressed each of our measures of productivity on dummy variables for the seven 
independent categories in the Venn diagram.  The calculations in Table 6 summarize the 
results.  There is evidence for complementarity in the effects with each of the measures of 
productivity, but the particular mixture of pay systems that have the largest impact on 
productivity differs among the productivity measures.   
In the regression for managers’ perception of productivity the biggest impacts occur 
when workplaces have all three forms of pay, or have employee share ownership and profit 
related pay or employee ownership and group pay for benefits.  This indicates that the 
positive impact of share ownership found in Table 5 occurs when share ownership is 
combined with profit-related pay or group pay for results.   
By contrast, in the regression in which productivity is measured by sales per worker, 
the biggest impacts on productivity occur when workplaces have employee share ownership 
and profit related pay or employee ownership and group pay for results.  Having share 
ownership by itself does better than having all the schemes together.   
The interactions are weakest in the value added regression, with the biggest impacts 
occurring when workplaces combine employee share ownership with group pay for results 
followed by combining it with profit-related pay.   
Finally, if we simplify the regressions by replacing the share ownership interactions 
with a single dummy identifying share ownership in combination with group payments-by-
results and/or profit-related pay, the dummy is positive and significant for all three 
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productivity measures, confirming that combinations of share capitalism systems which 
include share ownership are positively correlated with productivity, however we measure it.16  
 
Comparison with Prior Literature and Oxera-Treasury 
Our production function study follows a long line of UK analyses of the effects of shared 
capitalism.  Many analysts have used earlier waves of the WERS to examine the effects of 
various forms of shared capitalism on manager reports of financial outcomes or labor 
productivity.  Some have used surveys of particular sectors with quantitative measures of 
productivity such as sales or value added, often with in the order of 100 firms.  Bryson and 
Freeman (2007) and Oxera in its analysis for the UK Treasury (Oxera, 2007, appendix 2) 
summarize this work.  The two reviews show that the majority of studies find positive effects 
of shared capitalist pay on productivity or financial outcomes, while some find negligible 
effects and virtually none find negative effects.17  They also find that the pay schemes that 
have positive effects vary across studies and sometimes within the same study depending on 
the measure of outcomes or data under analysis.  
After we completed our research, the Treasury released a study that comes as close as 
we could imagine to giving a definitive analysis of the effects of tax-advantaged modes of 
shared capitalism on productivity.  This study has the largest sample of any done in the UK – 
16,844 firms – obtained by matching HM Revenue & Customs’ administrative data on 
Approved Profit Sharing systems, SAYE systems, and CSOP systems to measures of 
                                                 
16 The coefficients and t-statistics for share capitalist bundles incorporating share ownership 
are 0.492 (2.96) for managers’ assessments of productivity, 0.444 (2.12) for sales per 
employee and 0.035 (2.10) for value added per employee. 
17 A count of the studies in the Oxera report shows that ten of the thirteen that estimated the 
effects of profit-sharing found that it was associated with higher productivity while seven of 
the ten studies that examined share ownership found that it was associated with higher 
productivity.   
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productivity based on sales from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) data set.  In 
addition, the Oxera-Treasury study obtained measures of productivity for 7,633 companies 
based on value added from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) provided by the Office 
of National Statistics.  The Oxera-Treasury study covered enough years and firms to permit a 
panel analysis with fixed effects as well as cross section comparisons of firms with and 
without particular schemes.   
The results of the Oxera-Treasury study confirm the finding in our study and in the 
bulk of the earlier literature that shared capitalism raises productivity.  When the study 
measures output by sales (p iii) “on average, across the whole sample, the effect of tax-
advantaged share schemes is significant and increases productivity by 2.5% in the long run”.  
It also finds important complementarities in the effects that are consistent with our results: 
“there are further benefits to be gained from operating several types of schemes”, with gains 
accruing primarily to companies that have both tax advantaged and not tax-advantaged 
schemes; and with large gains for the SAYE share ownership scheme.   
With its large sample size and use of panel data as well as cross section data, the 
Oxera-Treasury analysis has arguably generated the strongest findings thus far on the effects 
of shared capitalism in the United Kingdom.  Surprisingly perhaps given the sample size, the 
Oxera-Treasury study reports variation in results that resemble those in our study and others 
using smaller data sets: lower estimated productivity gains when output is measured with 
value added than with sales; different estimated effects across sectors; and different estimates 
of which schemes matter most when output is measured in value added than when output is 
measured in sales.  The study notes that it lacks information on coverage of schemes or on 
other business practices of firms (as in the WERS) that could cast additional light on the 
impacts of the schemes.  
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Conclusion 
In sum, shared capitalism has grown in the UK, as it has in the US; firms use various forms 
of shared capitalist pay together and often accompany them with other labor practices, 
consistent with the complementary hypothesis.  But firms switch among schemes frequently, 
which suggests that they have trouble optimizing and that the transactions cost of switching 
are relatively low.  Among the single schemes, share ownership has the clearest positive 
association with productivity, but its impact is largest when firms combine it with other forms 
of shared capitalist pay.  Given that even the large sample Oxera-Treasury study finds sizable 
variation across groups, schemes, and measures of productivity, additional studies using 
administrative data or the richer but smaller WERS files are unlikely to greatly advance our 
knowledge of what makes shared capitalism work in the UK.  To advance our knowledge 
further would seem to require studies that focus specifically on capitalist firms per the US 
NBER 14 firm study with questions and case analyses directed at particular hypotheses about 
their operation.    
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Figure 1:  Incidence of Combinations of Shared Capitalist Pay Schemes, WERS 2004 
(workplaces with 5 or more employees) 
 
Actual and predicted incidence of Share Capitalism Practices  
 
 Actual Predicted 
PRP 34.5 - 
ESOS 19.6 - 
GPBR 25.7 - 
   
No scheme 49.7 39.1 
   
Single scheme: 27.0 43.5 
  PRP 14.4 20.5 
  ESOS 4.6 9.5 
  GRPP 8.2 13.5 
   
Two schemes: 17.0 15.5 
  ESOS & PRP 5.7 5.1 
  ESOS & GRPP 3.1 3.3 
  PRP & GRPP 8.2 7.1 
   
Three schemes: 6.2 1.7 
PRP 
34% 
ESOS 
20%
GPBR 
26% 
14%
8%
6% 
6% 
8% 3% 
5%
No form 50%
 21
 
Table 1:  Percentage of Workplaces and Employees covered by Shared Capitalism
in the UK, 2004 
 Workplaces (%) Employees (%) 
1.  Stock Ownership  20 32 
Share schemes 
  SIP 
  SAYE 
  CSOP 
  Others, including EMI 
 
7 
12 
6 
3 
 
11 
21 
11 
6 
Coverage of schemes 
  Managers only 
  1-99% non-managerial 
  100% non-managerial 
 
3 
3 
14 
 
4 
6 
22 
2. Group Based Payment by results 26 30 
3. Profit Related Pay 
     Some  
     1-99% non-managerial 
     100% non-managerial 
 
23 
7 
16 
 
29 
12 
18 
4. Number of Schemes 
  0 
  1 
  2 
  3 
 
50 
27 
17 
6 
 
38 
30 
24 
9 
5. Individual variable pay 
 Pay for individual PBR 
 Merit Pay 
 
34 
16 
 
43 
26 
 
 
Note:  Source Workplace Employment Relations Surveys.  2004 data relate to workplaces 
with 5+ employees whereas 1984 data relate to workplaces with 25+ employees.  Details of 
the pay schemes are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 2:  The distribution of shared capitalist forms of pay and proportion of 
workplaces changing their form of pay, 1998-2004 Panel of private sector 
workplaces with 10 or more employees 
 PRP exc 
deferred 
schemes 
All PRP 
inc 
deferred 
schemes 
Employee 
share 
ownership 
schemes 
Any PRP/ 
ESOS 
Payments-
by-results 
Distribution in %      
Distribution of all 
workplaces in 1998 
42 47 20 48 23 
Distribution of all 
workplaces in  2004 
42 42 20 49 33 
Net Change 0 -5 0 1 10 
      
Changes in Distribution       
Did not have program in 
1998 nor 2004 
 
43 
 
40 
 
71 
 
37 
 
58 
Added program between 
1998 and 2004 
15 18 9 14 9 
Had program in 1998 but 
dropped it by 2004 
15 13 10 15 18 
Had program in both 1998 
and 2004 
27 29 11 34 15 
Gross change 30 31 19 29 27 
 
Source:  Workplace Employment Relations Panel Survey 1998-2004. 
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Table 3:  Markov Chain Analysis of Equilibrium Distribution of Shared Capitalist Modes 
of Pay 
 
Panel A: Number of Shared Capitalist Pay Schemes: esos, prp, group pbr 
 
 1998 2004 equilibrium 
0 .499 .474 .438 
1 .292 .291 .287 
2 .156 .155 .184 
3 .053 .080 .090 
 
Note: n=587 private sector workplaces in WERS panel. All data are survey weighted.  Last 
column based on analyses by James Mitchell, NIESR, for which we are grateful.  Transition 
matrix A (in fact A' to ensure each column sums to unity) is raised to the power 2000. Since 
one of A's eigenvalues is unity we have an ergodic Markov chain and the long run forecast is 
thus independent of the current state.  
 
Panel B: Specific Combinations of Pay Schemes 
 
 1998 2004 equilibrium 
No Shared Capitalist Pay  .499 .474 .444 
    
Single Systems .292 .291 .281 
    ESOS only .035 .054 .047 
    GRPPBR only  .049 .044 .040 
     PRP only .208 .194 .184 
    
Two Systems .156 .155 .190 
ESOS + GRPPRP .001 .010 .013 
ESOS + PRP .108 .060 .081 
GRPPBR + PRP .047 .085 .096 
    
All three .053 .080 .094 
  
Note:  Due to rounding the rows of the transition matrix summed to 1.0001000 so we 
subtracted 0.0001 to ensure that they sum to unity. 
 
Source:  Tabulated from the 1998-2004 WERS panel data file on workplaces. 
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Table 4:  Coefficients and t-statistics Relating Other Pay and Workplace Policies to 
Shared Capitalist Pay Schemes. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) (12)
  indpbr  indpbr  merit  merit  decision decision Mon in Mon in Mon 
out 
Mon 
out 
apprais apprais
GRPP  0.266    0.006    0.241 0.052 0.289    0.150
  (6.01)**    (0.18)    (1.13) (0.66) (2.74)**    (1.75)
PRP  0.075    0.089    0.486 ‐0.051 0.280    0.082
  (1.91)    (2.71)**    (2.50)* (0.74) (2.98)**    (1.06)
ESOS  0.011    ‐0.008    ‐0.138 ‐0.018 0.503    0.472
  (0.20)    (0.20)    (0.50) (0.21) (3.72)**    (4.90)**
GRPP+PRP+ESOS    0.432  0.070  0.445 ‐0.053 1.168    0.675
    (5.53)**  (0.98)  (1.23) (0.39) (6.65)**    (4.17)**
ESOS+PRP    0.077  0.124  0.306 ‐0.101 0.429    0.560
    (0.98)  (1.82)  (0.67) (0.66) (2.11)*    (3.72)**
ESOS+GRPP    0.262  0.056  0.412 0.153 1.199    0.617
    (2.31)*  (0.63)  (0.79) (1.10) (4.16)**    (2.91)**
ESOS only    ‐0.046  ‐0.067  ‐0.358 ‐0.170 0.496    0.673
    (0.61)  (1.38)  (0.73) (1.34) (2.51)*    (4.88)**
PRP+GRPP    0.242  0.074  0.814 ‐0.006 0.537    0.249
    (3.52)**  (1.41)  (2.45)* (0.06) (3.29)**    (1.76)
GRPP only    0.324  0.025  0.004 ‐0.057 0.035    0.273
    (4.54)**  (0.50)  (0.01) (0.39) (0.23)    (1.89)
PRP only    0.101  0.089  0.519 ‐0.044 0.333    0.168
    (1.96)  (1.97)*  (1.93) (0.43) (2.77)**    (1.60)
Constant  0.271  0.294  0.067  0.081  10.181 10.044 2.012 1.938 1.098  1.168  1.252 1.222
  (1.75)  (1.93)  (0.59)  (0.72)  (16.38)** (15.81)** (7.29)** (6.76)** (3.39)**  (3.65)**  (4.76)** (4.65)**
Observations  1680  1684  1680  1684  1680 1684 1680 1684 1680  1684  1680 1684
R‐squared  0.22  0.23  0.09  0.09  0.20 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.30  0.31  0.28 0.28
 
Notes: 
(1) INDPBR (0,1): individual payments-by-results. MERIT(0,1): merit pay. DECISION (0,12): employer 
perceptions of employee decision-making autonomy among employees in the workplace’s largest occupational 
group or ‘core employees’.  HR managers were asked: “Using the scale on this card, to what extent would you 
say that individuals in [ TITLE OF THE LARGEST OCCUPATIONAL GROUP] here have variety in their 
work, discretion over how they do their work, control over the pace at which they work, involvement in 
decisions over how their work is organized?” The scale on the card was “a lot, some, a little, none”.  An additive 
scale was created running from 0 (‘none’ on all four items) to 12 (‘a lot’ on all four items).  MON IN (0,4): 
additive scale for the monitoring of worker inputs , the workplace scoring a point when the quality of 
employees’ work is monitored by supervisors, if some/all supervisors can dismiss employees for unsatisfactory 
performance, where 20%+ of employees are supervisors.  A point is deducted if employees monitor the quality 
of their own work (co-monitoring).  Finally a point is added to the scores so they range from 0,4 rather than -1,3.  
MON OUT (0,4) additive scale for monitoring outputs scoring a point when the quality of output is monitored 
through inspectors located elsewhere, through customer surveys, records of faults/complaints are kept, there are 
targets for productivity and records are kept.  APPRAIS (0, 3) additive scale for appraisal systems scoring a 
point when all non-managerial staff are appraised, appraisals occur half-yearly or quarterly, and non-managerial 
pay is linked to performance appraisal. 
(2) All models contain following controls: firm size (3 dummies); single-workplace organization (single 
dummy); industry (12 dummies); foreign owned (single dummy); workplace aged 25+ year (single dummy); 
recognises union for pay bargaining (2 dummies); largest occupational group (8 dummies); has many 
competitors (single dummy); product market is growing (single dummy).  In addition the INDPBR models 
contain controls for monitoring inputs, outputs, appraisal and decision-making; the decision-making models 
contain controls for monitoring inputs and outputs and appraisals; and the monitoring and appraisal models 
contain controls for decision-making.   
 
 25
Table 5:  Coefficients and t statistics Relating Manager Reports of Productivity, 
Ln Sales/Employee and Ln Value Added/employee to Shared Capitalist Pay Schemes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Management 
view of lab 
prod 
Management 
View of lab 
prod 
Ln 
sales/Em 
Ln 
Sales/Em 
Ln 
VA/emp 
Ln 
VA/emp 
GRPP 0.042 0.031 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.34) (0.25) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) 
PRP 0.113  -0.040  -0.003  
 (1.09)  (0.33)  (0.31)  
ESOS 0.305  0.436  0.033  
 (2.28)*  (2.90)**  (2.75)**  
PRP (ref: 
none) 
      
1-99% covered  -0.149  0.033  0.026 
  (0.81)  (0.18)  (1.96) 
100% covered  0.269  -0.284  -0.015 
  (2.09)*  (1.63)  (1.78) 
ESOS (ref: 
none) 
      
Managers only  0.180  0.475  -0.001 
  (0.95)  (2.05)*  (0.05) 
1-99% non-
managers 
covered 
 0.032  0.274  0.009 
  (0.11)  (1.43)  (0.47) 
100% non-
managers 
covered 
 0.356  0.513  0.045 
  (2.36)*  (2.96)**  (3.24)** 
cut1:Constant -0.960 -0.983     
 (2.48)* (2.56)*     
cut2:Constant 0.702 0.687     
 (1.77) (1.75)     
cut3:Constant 2.196 2.189     
 (5.43)** (5.45)**     
Constant   4.523 4.546 6.553 6.551 
   (13.93)** (14.14)** (227.88)** (240.53)** 
Observations 1487 1486 577 577 517 517 
R-squared   0.54 0.55 0.34 0.37 
 
Note:  control variables are as per Table 4 except that the monitoring and appraisal variables 
were entered separately rather than additive scales and individual PBR and merit pay are 
included as controls. 
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Table 6:  Coefficients and t statistics for the effects of complementarity among Shared 
Capitalist Pay and other workplace arrangements on managers’ reports of Productivity 
(labrod), Ln Sales/Employee (lnte) and Ln Value Added/employee (lngvae)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 labprod lnte lngvae 
ESOS + PRP + GRPP 0.505 0.119 0.011 
 (2.51)* (0.46) (0.57) 
ESOS + PRP 0.550 0.647 0.041 
 (2.55)* (2.89)** (1.77) 
ESOS + GRPP 0.480 0.782 0.082 
 (1.93) (2.36)* (2.38)* 
PRP + GRPP -0.020 0.034 0.002 
 (0.10) (0.19) (0.20) 
ESOS only 0.067 0.301 0.004 
 (0.32) (1.94) (0.27) 
GRPP only 0.212 0.063 -0.018 
 (1.14) (0.30) (1.56) 
PRP only 0.208 -0.003 -0.010 
 (1.47) (0.02) (1.03) 
cut1:Constant -0.919   
 (2.42)*   
cut2:Constant 0.750   
 (1.93)   
cut3:Constant 2.257   
 (5.70)**   
Constant  4.525 6.552 
  (14.19)** (235.41)** 
Observations 1490 578 518 
R-squared  0.55 0.36 
 
Note:  Controls are as per Table 5. 
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Appendix:  Survey Questions Used to Derive Share Capitalism Variables 
 
The share capitalism measures are derived from the following survey questions. 
 
Payments-by-results (PBR) 
 
“Do any of the employees in this establishment get paid by results or receive merit pay? On 
this card is an explanation of what we mean by payment by results and merit pay.” 
 
 
Card reads:  
 
1. Payment by results  
 
‘Payment by results’ includes any method of payment where he pay is determined by the 
amount done or its value, rather than just the number of hours worked. It includes 
commission, and bonuses that are determined by individual, establishment or organization 
productivity or performance. It does not include profit-related pay schemes.  
 
2. Merit pay  
 
‘Merit pay’ is related to a subjective assessment of individual performance by a supervisor or 
manager.  
 
Follow-up questions establish the occupations covered by PBR and the percentage of non-
managerial employees covered.  In addition the following question establishes whether PBR 
is calculated at individual, group or organization level: 
 
“Thinking just about payment by results, what / What) measures of performance are used to 
determine the amount that employees receive?”  
PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None'.  
1) Individual performance/output,  
2) Group or team performance/output,  
3) Workplace-based measures,  
4) Organization-based measures,  
5) Other measures 
 
Profit-related pay 
 
“Do any employees at this workplace receive profit-related payments or profit-related 
bonuses?”  
 
Follow-up questions establish the occupations covered by PRP, the percentage of non-
managerial employees covered, and the percentage in receipt of PRP payments.  In addition 
the following question establishes the organizational level at which PRP is calculated if the 
workplace is part of a larger organization: 
 
“For what part of your organization is the amount of profit-related pay 
calculated….Workplace, Division/Subsidiary company, Organization as a whole?”  
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Share schemes 
 
“Does this company operate any of the employee share schemes listed on this card for any of 
the employees at this workplace?  
PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None'.  
1) Share Incentive Plan (SIP),  
2)Save As You Earn (SAYE or Sharesave),  
3) Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI),  
4) Company Share Option Plan (CSOP),  
5)Other employee share scheme,  
6) None of these” 
 
 
Card reads:  
 
1 Share Incentive Plan (SIP) – a tax and NIC advantaged plan where employees can purchase 
shares and companies can give employees free shares or matching shares 2 Save As You 
Earn (SAYE or Sharesave) share options scheme – tax advantaged scheme where employees 
save to purchase their employer’s shares.  
3 Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) - where smaller companies can grant up to a total 
of £3 million of tax and NIC advantaged share options to their employees 
4 Company Share Option Plan (CSOP) – where companies can grant each of their employees 
up to £30,000 of tax and NIC advantaged share options  
5 Other employee share scheme  
 
Subsequent questions identify the occupations eligible for share ownership schemes and the 
percentage participating in schemes. 
 
Recent introduction of performance-related pay 
 
Over the past two years has management here introduced any of the changes listed on this 
card? PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None':  
1) Introduction of performance related pay  
2) Introduction or upgrading of computers  
3) Introduction or upgrading of other types of new technology  
4) Changes in working time arrangements  
5) Changes in the organization of work  
6) Changes in work techniques or procedures  
7)  Introduction of initiatives to involve employees  
8) Introduction of technologically new or significantly improved product or service  
9) None of these  
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